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NSF now provides. This special role for ONR
was a great beneﬁt to marine science, especially
as the Navy went all out in its battle with the Air
Force for primacy in the defense establishment.
Interest in containing Soviet Communism led
the United States to sponsor international sci-
ence, but “the cooperative programs in ocean-
ography of the 1950s were much more a part of
the military’s interest” (p. 31). Then the scien-
tists, battling the Navy’s penchant for secrecy,
discovered that international cooperation could
unlock their data. (The Navy acquiesced because
it found that cooperation brought it additional
data at no cost.) Though governments ﬁnanced
the International Geophysical Year (IGY)
(1957–1958) and its sequel, the International
Geophysical Cooperation (1959), scientists ran
the show. Their efforts culminated in the First
International Congress of Oceanography (1959)
in New York.
Coincident with the planning for the IGY,
UNESCO began a program in marine science
that led to the Scientiﬁc (originally Special)
Committee on Oceanography. There scientists
debated the future of their science. UNESCOhad
to create another body, the Intergovernmental
Oceanographic Commission (IOC), actually to
manage the interactions among national pro-
grams. “By 1966 the IOC had coordinated about
250 cruises over a wide area” (p. 137). The con-
cerns of physical oceanographers that ﬁsheries
research would predominate led them to shift
their support from the IOC to NATO. At the
same time, they could avoid the Soviet penchant
for what the Western scientists perceived as un-
imaginative general surveys, as opposed to
cruises designed to test hypotheses. TheWestern
scientists were vindicated when their collective
efforts led through seaﬂoor spreading to plate
tectonics, the revolution in geology that began
with studies of the ocean ﬂoor. The Russians,
with their scientiﬁc communities run from the
top down, did not participate in the revolution
and accepted it only grudgingly.
Hamblin documents the increasing bureaucra-
tization of marine research as its rationale shifted
from pure science to economic development.
The quest for a “wet NASA” led in the Johnson
administration to a Marine Sciences Council that
sponsored the International Decade of Ocean Ex-
ploration (IDOE). Contrary to the scientists’
wishes, the IDOE was government-to-govern-
ment under the IOC, “what Soviet scientists had
long dreamed of: the standardization of obser-
vational methods, top-down planning, and the
close coordination of large-scale oceanographic
surveys” (p. 255). “Social beneﬁts” became “the
focus of activity” by 1970 (p. 258). And Presi-
dent Nixon abolished theMarine Sciences Coun-
cil in 1971. Nevertheless, the scientists did stim-
ulate into action what Hamblin calls the
“disciples of marine science,” and they continue
to support marine research in the United States.
Hamblin includes a helpful list of abbrevia-
tions that appear in the text. I found his scholarly
apparatus cumbersome: his notes offer short ti-
tles only, so one has to consult the bibliography
to determine the precise source. And the listing
of all unattributed newspaper clippings under
“Anonymous,” rather than under the newspa-
per’s name, seems peculiar. These caveats not-
withstanding, this readable book is remarkably
free of typos. Anyone interested in either the sci-
ence of the sea or American science between
1945 and 1970 will beneﬁt substantially from
this signiﬁcant contribution to the history of sci-
ence.
HAROLD L. BURSTYN
Laura Hein. Reasonable Men, Powerful Words:
Political Culture and Expertise in Twentieth-
Century Japan. (Twentieth-Century Japan: The
Emergence of a World Power.) xvii 328 pp.,
illus., bibl., index. Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 2004. $45 (cloth).
Laura Hein provides a detailed, scholarly ac-
count of the lives and ideas of six Japanese econ-
omists: O¯ uchi Hyo¯e (1888–1980) and ﬁve of his
students. In what amounts to a collective biog-
raphy, Hein traces how they were politically ac-
tive and sought to inﬂuence public policy in Ja-
pan from the 1920s to the 1980s.
Of the six, O¯ uchi and Arisawa Hiromi (1896–
1988) had much in common. Both served as
president of Ho¯sei University, and both were ac-
tive in the Japan Socialist Party. O¯ uchi, Arisawa,
O¯ mori Yoshitaro¯ (1898–1940), Wakimura
Yoshitaro¯ (1900–1996), Takahashi Masao
(1901–1995), and Minobe Ryo¯kichi (1904–
1984) were all arrested and imprisoned in the
late 1930s for engaging in subversive thought in
what was an increasingly militaristic Japan. Mi-
nobe eventually served with distinction as gov-
ernor of Tokyo (1967–1979) and subsequently
became a member of the House of Councillors
(1980–1984).
What does their story tell us? Much of what
Hein writes is applicable to other left-wing in-
tellectuals in Japan, especially scientists. The so-
cial scientists that Hein treats inhabit the same
intellectual terrain as scientists on the left. As the
title of the book suggests, social scientists
brought rationality, the scientiﬁc method (espe-
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cially through the use of statistics), and rhetoric
to bear in their efforts to reform politics in the
aftermath of World War II.
Although Hein is concerned with the history
of economics as a social science, and with the
prominence of Marxist economic thought, her
story extends beyond that to the history of the
social sciences in Japan. There are many un-
stated parallels with the story of scientists as pol-
icymakers in postwar Japan. Both became part
of a new technocratic elite that was able to ap-
proach the problems of the nation in a “scien-
tiﬁc” and more universal way. Like scientists,
social scientists were at times divided as to how
to use their expertise. All sought to provide ad-
vice on policy debates that were sometimes ar-
guably beyond their expertise—on matters from
energy and industrial policy to the environment.
It can be argued that both social scientists and
scientists contributed to the shaping of a public
sphere. Natural scientists, however, are largely
missing from Hein’s story. She points to how the
scientiﬁc ethos of economists helped to make
them special, but she neglects the role of other
scientists. Instead, she suggests that it was only
economists and engineers who “offered viable
strategies for starting over” after the war (p. 8).
In some of the text of the book, one could replace
“social science” with “science” and the claims
would still be correct. Hein’s account neverthe-
less is valuable in helping us to understand the
rise of left-wing intellectuals in Japan. It pro-
vides the context for understanding how other
actors also had a role that arguably was just as
important.
In the 1920s and 1930s, O¯ uchi and his stu-
dents in the Department of Economics at Tokyo
Imperial University sought to understand why
Japan was not as modern and rational as Europe
(p. 13). A trip to Germany in the early 1920s
provided O¯ uchi with evidence of the popularity
of Marxist economics in Europe, but by the time
his students traveled there in the 1930s times had
changed and Europe was seen as a place where
such ideas were repressed rather than encour-
aged. They viewed the rise of the Third Reich as
evidence of how easily modernizing nations—
such as Germany and fascist Japan—could slip
back into irrationality.
Rather than dwelling in detail on how the
economists embraced Marxist analysis, Hein
places the focus on their role as public intellec-
tuals. Publishing articles under pseudonyms in
left-wing journals such as Taishu¯ (1926–1927),
Ro¯no¯ (1927–1932), and Zenshin (1932–1933),
they explored the nature of Japanese capitalism
and carved out an intellectual space for them-
selves. But such debate was not tolerated in the
years leading up to Pearl Harbor, when voices of
dissent were silenced. Their opposition to the
war in China landed O¯ uchi, Arisawa, O¯ mori,
Wakimura, Takahashi, and Minobe in jail in
1937 and 1938. They advised the government
that it could not win an extended war but were
ignored. O¯ mori died of cancer in 1940, but the
others would survive their wartime ordeals and
emerge strongly as public intellectuals during
the Allied Occupation of Japan (1945–1952).
The group sought to reshape Japan’s economy
in the 1950s by writing and debating their ideas,
especially in Sekai, a journal that championed
peace, democracy, and internationalism. They
also participated in labor-related government
committee work (Arisawa) and organizations
such as the maritime industry labor arbitration
board (Wakimura). They were committed to the
use of statistical data as a badge of expertise and
objectivity; for them, statistics provided, in
Hein’s words, “the best defense against the re-
turn of fascism” (p. 100). Interestingly, they
linked the economic beneﬁts of democracy to
paciﬁsm, arguing that peace was a public good
that needed to be preserved through economic
strategies.
This book is an invaluable study of how left-
wing intellectuals worked to make a better Ja-
pan. While Marxism and social science no
longer wield the political power and appeal that
they did in the decades immediately after the
war, this book helps us to understand their at-
traction and how half a dozen economists were
able to make a difference.
MORRIS LOW
W. D. Kay. Deﬁning NASA: The Historical De-
bate over the Agency’s Mission. xii  247 pp.,
index. Albany: State University of New York
Press, 2005. $24 (paper).
W. D. Kay, a political scientist, has produced a
provocative analysis of NASA’s mission from
the 1950s through the 1990s. His thesis is that
President John F. Kennedy, by capitalizing on a
special moment in history, gave NASA a mis-
sion: to beat the Soviet Union to the moon. Once
that goal was achieved, no president who came
after him was able to conceive and articulate a
comparable mission for the agency. In Kay’s
view, the inability of NASA and its supporters
in Congress to answer the question, “What is
NASA for?” explains the decline of NASA’s
budget and its diminished prestige over the past
thirty years.
Kay develops many of the themes discussed
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